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The Dormant Commerce Clause After Garcia:
An Application to the Interstate Commerce
of Sanitary Landfill Space
J~Ams HNsHAw*
And finally Sarah Cynthia Sylvia Stout said,
"OK, I'll take the garbage out!"
But then, of course, it was too late
The garbage reached across the state,
From New York to the Golden Gate.
And there, in the garbage she did hate,
Poor Sarah met an awful fate,
That I cannot right now relate
Because the hour is much too late.'
INTRODUCTION
Because sanitary landfill space is rapidly diminishing, it is quickly becom-
ing one of the United States' most sought after resources. 2 This situation
has reached near-crisis proportions because, as our nation's population
continues to grow, our land resources are increasingly used for residential
and commercial development. In the latter half of this century, the United
States has epitomized the "throw-away society," and its citizens have smugly
found it convenient to ignore the consequences of their growth and behavior
upon our environment and natural resources. Until recently, United States
citizens have refused to responsibly resolve the problems created by their
ever-increasing production of garbage.3 The repercussions of this past
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1989,
DePauw University.
1. S. StvERsTEmN, Sarah Cynthia Sylvia Stout Would Not Take the Garbage Out, in
WHERE THE SmrwAiK ENDS (1984).
2. Pomper, Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce
Clause, Postindustrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
1309, 1309-10 (1989). See generally, D. CHmRAs, ENvrmomENTAI SCIENCE: ACTION FOR A
SusTrANABE FuauRE (1991).
3. See C. ANDarss, WASTE NOT, WANT NOT: STATE AND FEDERAL ROLES IN SOURCE
REDUcTIoN AND RECYCLING OF SOLID WASTE 1-6 (1989); D. CHIAS, supra note 2, at 443; H.
NE.AL & J.R. Sctmm., SOuD WASTE MANAGEMENT AND THE E&vmoNMENT: THE MotNTIG
GARBAGE AND TRASH CRISIS 1-19 (1987); DeLogu, "NIMBY" Is a National Environmental
Problem, 35 S.D.L. REv. 198 (1990); Wakefield, Problems Associated with the Management
of Solid Wastes: Is There a Solution in the Offing?, 83 W. VA. L. Rv. 131 (1980); Gutis,
The End Begins for Trash No One Wanted, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1987, at BI, col. 3; see also
ANDERSON, MANDELKER & TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 687
(1990).
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complacency toward the environment and the effects of our nation's growth
have led to the modern crisis of shortages in landfill space.
Because of these shortages in landfill space, a closely related controversy
has developed regarding states that haul their municipal waste into other
states and dump it there, thereby consuming existing landfill capacity within
the recipient state while preserving their own remaining landfill capacities. 4
This practice is a problem for all recipient states but particularly so for
those states that have previously implemented solid-waste disposal planning
in order to preserve landfill capacity for their own citizens. It renders past
plans and efforts useless and future planning futile.5 Because a state has no
ability to predict when and how much garbage another state will export,
the recipient state has no ability to effectively plan, zone, and budget its
land resources for the future needs of its own citizens.
State governments and their citizenry are often outraged by this situation.6
As a result, state legislators have increased their efforts to resolve the
problem and meet constituencies' demands. The United States Supreme
Court has held, though, that a state may not legislate against out-of-state
interests through regulations that either explicitly prohibit the importation
of out-of-state garbage or have a discriminatory effect on "interstate com-
merce. '7 Furthermore, the federal government has declined to accept the
challenge of resolving this dilemma.8 Thus, the burden of finding and
developing a solution in this constitutionally restricted area still remains
4. This Note does not address the political and environmental issues of interstate garbage
hauling per se. Rather, this Note focuses solely on the constitutional ability of a state
government to control or regulate the rate of consumption of landfill capacity within its
borders by out-of-state entities.
5. 136 CoNo. Riac. S13,168-70 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1990) (statements of Sen. Dan Coats).
6. One significant result of a new environmental awareness in the nation's communities
is unprecedented "grass-roots" support of and response to recycling and source reduction
programs. Citizens are getting involved and implementing solutions to the nation's solid waste
disposal problems. See, e.g., Scheckler, First Week of Recycling a Big Success, The Herald-
Times (Bloomington, Ind.), Jan. 5, 1991 at Cl; see also Trash Glut Demands Recycling
Solution, USA Today, Feb. 19, 1991, at 10A. Given increased awareness and genuine effort
by local groups to reduce their own unnecessary production of garbage, waste of resources,
and consumption of landfill space, it is understandable that citizens resent other states who
dump their garbage in landfill space that the local community has been trying to preserve.
7. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) ("[W]here simple economic
protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been
erected."). Even though the New Jersey legislature had not enacted its regulation to specifically
protect economic interests within the state, id. at 625, the Court found the statute facially
discriminatory and thus an impermissible means of achieving even a legitimate goal such as
environmental protection or preservation of resources. Id. at 627. Also, the Court held that
garbage was an article of commerce since "[a]ll objects of interstate trade merit commerce
clause protection." Id. at 622. Accordingiy, garbage is not an exception to dormant commerce
clause scrutiny under the rationale that it is either "innately harmful" or "valueless." Id.
8. Although Congress has generally regulated waste disposal through the Solid Waste
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 (1991), it has not given the states the power to regulate the
flow of out-of-state garbage coming into their landfills.
[Vol. 67:511
DORMANT COMMERCE CLA USE
with the states-at least until Congress acts. The three most prominent
methods developed for preserving landfill space involve, either independently
or in combination, (1) recycling and resource recovery programs, 9 (2) state
control of landfill services,' 0 and (3) regulations which explicitly discriminate
against out-of-state interests."
State regulation of interstate solid-waste disposal is subject to constitu-
tional scrutiny under the dormant commerce clause doctrine. However, this
doctrine was fundamentally altered by the broad federalism principles es-
tablished in the Supreme Court case of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority2 where "affirmative" commerce clause issues were ad-
dressed. 3 In Garcia, the Supreme Court set forth the "political process
theory" to explain the structure of our federal system of government
whenever interstate commerce is regulated. According to this theory, state
sovereignty rights are protected when Congress enacts interstate commerce
legislation because state interests are directly represented in the national
political processes by the composition of Congress. Because Congress's
composition protects states' interests, the Court held that courts should not
play any role in delineating and protecting an absolute sphere of state
sovereignty rights. However, when the political processes are not operating
effectively, the Supreme Court held that courts should intervene to protect
states' interests. The dormant commerce clause situation provides such an
occasion. Thus, the courts' role was fundamentally changed by Garcia since
the dormant commerce clause situation is one where the nation's political
processes are not operating to effectively protect states' interests. The courts
are now obliged under the broad federalism principles set forth in Garcia
to assertively protect states' interests in the dormant commerce clause
doctrine's interest-balancing analysis. Although this fundamental change has
9. C. ANDRmSS, supra note 3, at 35-63 (a comprehensive survey of states' activities in this
area).
10. See Swin Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989), aff'g 678
F. Supp. 1116 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Industrial Maintenance Serv. v. Moore, 677 F. Supp. 436
(S.D.W. Va. 1987); LeFrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987); Evergreen
Waste Sys. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127 (D. Or. 1986), aff'd., 820 F.2d 1492
(9th Cir. 1987); Shayne Bros. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984);
County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 473 A.2d 12 (1984).
11. See Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs. v. Bayh, 734 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind.
1990).
12. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
13. There is a significant distinction between the dormant commerce clause and the
affirmative commerce clause doctrines. The Constitution grants to Congress "[t]he Power to
... regulate Commerce ... among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Thus,
any article of interstate commerce is a potential subject of Congressional regulation. The
affirmative commerce clause comes into play when Congress actually asserts this power and
regulates that article of interstate commerce. Even if Congress's regulation is in the form of
a decision to defer to state control, Congress has still asserted its affirmative commerce clause
powers. In contrast, the dormant commerce clause comes into play when Congress has not
asserted any disposition of power to control an article of interstate commerce.
19921
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sweeping implications for dormant commerce clause doctrine in general, it
should prove particularly beneficial to those states that are trying to regulate
the consumption of their landfill capacities by out-of-state entities.
This Note will begin with an analysis of the Garcia opinion. The discussion
will then turn to the general dormant commerce clause analysis, its under-
lying principles, and its "market participant" doctrine. After these prelim-
inary matters, the Note will explain how the courts' fundamental role in
the dormant commerce clause context was changed by the Garcia opinion
in such a way that the courts' primary role is now to protect states' interests.
Finally, the Note will conclude with an application of this overall analysis
to the dormant commerce clause issues that arise when states regulate
interstate solid waste disposal.
I. GARCLA AND DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS
In attempting to preserve landfill space through regulations which either
discriminate against 14 or unduly burden"5 consumption by out-of-state inter-
ests, a state quickly finds itself in the midst of a struggle between state
sovereignty rights and Congress's commerce clause powers. When the Su-
preme Court disengaged economic substantive due process rights from the
fourteenth amendment in 1937,16 the Court simultaneously cleared the way
for the modern Court's expansive interpretation df Congress's commerce
clause powers. For over half a century, the Court's interpretation of the
commerce clause enabled Congress to regulate activity in essentially any
area regardless of the degree of its actual impact (or lack thereof) on
interstate commerce.' 7 Thus, where fundamental notions of state sovereignty
are allegedly infringed by Congress's seemingly omnipotent commerce clause
powers, significant disagreement results. 8
14. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
15. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.
Id. (citation omitted).
16. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
17. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
18. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (wage increases of state employees
were limited by federal regulation); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (federal minimum
wage and hour regulations applied to employees of schools and hospitals operated by the
state); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946) (federal price ceiling imposed against state's sales
of state-owned timber); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (federal penalty levied
against state-owned railroad for violation of federal law).
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From the New Deal era until 1976, this struggle invariably resulted in
victories for Congress. However, in 1976 the Court held in Usery v. National
League of Cities 9 that the tenth amendment was intended to preserve a
definable set of substantive sovereignty rights for the states. Thus, for a
while, the tenth amendment theoretically served as an affirmative limit on
Congress's power to regulate under the commerce clause. However, while
the Court followed and shaped this doctrine in theory for the following
eight years, it never actually invoked it again to strike down federal
commerce clause legislation2 ° Then, in 1985, the Court explicitly overruled
National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.2 1
A. Garcia and the Affirmative Commerce Clause
In National League of Cities, the Court held that the states were immune
from federal regulation that addressed traditional state governmental func-
tions because the federalism structure contemplated in the Constitution and
embodied in the tenth amendment prohibited such impositions. Thus, state
laws would affirmatively preempt these federal regulations despite an oth-
erwise valid exercise of commerce clause power.2"
19. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
20. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 742
(1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Red., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
21. 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985). While the Garcia opinion represents the Court's current
stance on state sovereignty rights and the basic structure of federalism under the commerce
clause, the remarkable fervor with which the dissenters disagreed with the Garcia majority and
their promises for a return to the principles embodied in National League of Cities indicate
the instability of the theories within the Court itself. See Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 580 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) ("[The National League of Cities] principle ... will, I am confident, in time
again command the support of a majority of this Court."); id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("I share Justice Rehnquist's belief .... "). This has never been more true than in recent
years when three new justices have been appointed to the Court. More importantly, the
independent validity of these theories is questionable as well. For extensive discussions and
criticisms of Garcia, see J.C. GRIFFI, FEDERALIsM: THE SinTpao BALxAcE (1989); Kaden,
Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 CoLUM. L. Ra,. 847 (1979);
Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia,
1985 Sup. CT. Rnv. 341; Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MicH. L. REv.
1709 (1985). Nevertheless, Garcia has found a firm niche in constitutional law. See South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (application of political process theory adopted by
Court in Garcia is affirmed). The scope of the larger principles of federalism which are
embodied in Garcia's holding have not yet been fully explored. Such a comprehensive task is
beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note will explore the limits of those principles as
applied to the particular context of the dormant commerce clause.
22. In an attempt to help lower courts apply National League of Cities, the Court later
identified several controlling factors in the analysis. Federal regulation under the commerce
clause would violate the tenth amendment if it: (1) regulated the "States as States," (2)
addressed matters that were indisputable attributes of state sovereignty, (3) directly impaired
a state's ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions;
and (4) did not justify state submission because of the weak nature of the federal interest.
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88 & n.29. However, the Supreme Court never again decided a case
where these criteria for state sovereignty were actually satisfied.
1992]
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Writing for the majority in Garcia, Justice Blackmun asserted that there
were two fatal defects to the National League of Cities analysis. 23 First, he
stated that the National League of Cities' "function standard" was "un-
workable." Indeed, as he pointed out, the lower courts were unable to
discern any guiding principle which would consistently define those "tra-
ditional [state] governmental functions." z The Supreme Court itself was
thus unable to effectively articulate any organizing principles for discerning
those state activities which fall within this absolute and elusive realm of
state sovereignty.
Justice Blackmun's second criticism of National League of Cities was that
the structure adopted there and "any other [doctrine] ... purport[ing] to
separate out important governmental functions can[not] be faithful to the
role of federalism in a democratic society." 26 The Court said that something
was fundamentally wrong with trying to explain or define the sphere of
state sovereignty through a judicial interpretation of what kind of activity
is traditionally within the states' area of functioning. Any such structure
would ultimately, and necessarily, turn on a judicial determination of what
was or was not an integral, or "traditional," state government function.27
Thus, "[a]ny such rule [would] lead to inconsistent results at the same time
that it disserves principles of democratic self-governance." 2
After explicitly overruling the National League of Cities' tenth amendment
definition of state sovereignty, the Court faced the task of defming the
"true" nature of the commerce clause relationship between the states and
Congress. The Court's main obstacle lay "not [with] the perception that
the Constitution's federal structure imposes limitations on the commerce
clause, but rather [with] the nature and content of those limitations. "29
Thus, "[i]f there are to be limits on the Federal Government's power to
interfere with state functions-as undoubtedly there are-[the Court] must
look elsewhere to find them."'30 The Court's search began with the reasoning
that because the "text of the Constitution provides the beginning rather
23. 426 U.S. 833. Ironically, both National League of Cities and Garcia were five to four
opinions with Justice Blackmun being both the deciding vote in National League of Cities as
well as the author of, and deciding vote in, the Garcia opinion.
24. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
25. Id. at 538. As the Court stated: "We find it difficult, if not impossible, to identify an
organizing principle." Id. at 539 (emphasis added). Just prior to this language the Court cited
a long list of cases in which these inconsistencies were demonstrated. Id. at 538.
26. Id. at 545-46.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 547.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. (emphasis added). Notice that the language which Justice Blackmun has chosen to
use is in the plural form. This implicitly acknowledges that there must be at least more than
one source of a state sovereignty limitation on the federal government's commerce clause
powers. This language will be important later in the discussion of the dormant commerce
clause.
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than the final answer to every inquiry into questions of federalism" '31 it
must therefore search '[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions
[for] postulates which limit and control.' '3 2
The Court's new theory of federalism under the commerce clause began
with Justice Blackmun's statement that "[a]part from the limitation on
federal authority inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I
powers . . . the principal means chosen by the Framers" to preserve the
states' sovereignty rights "lies in the structure of the Federal Government
itself."' 33 Thus, the Court said
that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes
on the commerce clause to protect the "States as States" is one of
process rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint on the
exercise of commerce clause powers must find its justification in the
procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to
compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather
than to dictate a "sacred province of state autonomy."3'
Because the states are represented in both houses of Congress, their "sov-
ereign" interests are presumably protected "from overreaching by Con-
gress."" "[Tihe principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power
is that inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our
system provides through state participation in federal governmental action.
The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will
not be promulgated. ' 36 The Court thereby deflated the tenth amendment
to a mere "truism' 's3 by holding that while the "[s]tates unquestionably do
'retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority,' they do so... only
to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original
powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government."" Thus
the Court held that the tenth amendment will no longer serve as an
affirmative limit on the commerce power. Instead, states now must look to
the national political processes for protection of their interests as states
because these processes serve as the "primary" limit on Congress's com-
merce clause powers.
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)).
33. Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 554 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 236).
35. Id. at 551.
36. Id. at 556.
37. The Court borrowed this phrase from Justice Stone in United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (The tenth amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has
not been surrendered.").
38. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549 (citation omitted) (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at
269) (Powell, J., dissenting). "[T]oday's decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to
meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the commerce clause." Id. at 560 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
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B. The Dormant Commerce Clause
1. The General Doctrine
When a state regulates an activity which is potentially subject to federal
control because the activity involves "commerce among the states," such
regulation raises dormant commerce clause issues. These issues arise when
Congress has not asserted its control over that interstate activity by address-
ing it in any form. Accordingly, Congress's intentions are unknown. Because
the text of the Constitution is silent regarding this dilemma, the Court has
developed the dormant commerce clause doctrine to "guide" 3 9 states' activ-
ities in this important area.40
There are two general situations where state regulation of interstate
commerce has traditionally invoked judicial scrutiny under the dormant
commerce clause doctrine. In 1986, the Court summarized this analysis as
follows:
[We have] adopted what amounts to a two-tiered approach.... When
a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate com-
merce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over
out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without
further inquiry. When, however, a statuite has only indirect effects on
interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined
whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on
interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits. We have also
recognized that there is no clear line separating the [first] category of
state regulation that is virtually per se invalid under the commerce
clause, and the [second] category [which is] subject to the Pike v. Bruce
Church balancing approach. In either situation the critical consideration
is the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate activity.4
39. The lack of any truly helpful guidance from the Supreme Court was surmised by
commentators who flippantly "restated" the dormant commerce clause doctrine as follows:
Although the power of the Federal Government over interstate commerce is
plenary, the states may regulate commerce some, but not too much. If a state
attempts to regulate commerce too much such regulation will be unconstitutional.
Caveat: This Restatement is not intended to express any opinion as to how
much regulation is too much.
W. LoCKHART, Y. KAmsAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTTo0NAL LAW 349 (4th ed. 1975) (quoting
1 HAav. L. REv. 5, 11-12 (1932)).
40. Significantly, even Justice Scalia has acknowledged some validity to this constitutional
doctrine: "It has long been accepted that the commerce clause not only grants Congress the
authority to regulate commerce among the States, but also directly limits the power of the
States to discriminate against interstate commerce." New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269, 273 (1988).
41. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-
79 (1986) (citations omitted). Notice that while the Court speaks of a two-tier analysis, there
are really three types of cases involved in the dormant commerce clause analysis: (1) discrim-
inatory purpose cases, (2) discriminatory effect cases, and (3) unduly burdensome cases. See
supra note 15 for the Pike balancing test.
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While the Court describes its analysis as two-tiered, courts actually take
into consideration several factors when deciding the tier into which a state
regulation falls. 42 This explains why the Court's initial tier-delineation doc-
trine is not, and cannot be, "clear"-as the Supreme Court has itself
acknowledged. Indeed, the "two-tiered" approach is ultimately a useless
doctrine for either predicting the outcome of a decision or discovering the
true nature of what the courts do in dormant commerce clause cases. This
point was made implicitly in Brown-Forman when the Court said "[ifn
either situation the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute
on both local and interstate activity." 43 The same point was made even
clearer in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises4 where Justice
Kennedy stated "[t]he Ohio statute before us might have been held to be a
discrimination that invalidates without extended inquiry. We choose, how-
ever, to assess the interests of the State, [as well as] ... the burden imposed
on interstate commerce. '45
Since the analysis is fundamentally an evaluation of several variable
factors, the tier analysis is simply a convenient generalization, or structure,
imposed on the factor evaluation. Strict adherence to it leads to further
confusion and frustration in understanding what the courts are really doing
in the dormant commerce clause area and in predicting what the courts will
do in this area in the future. 46 To ignore this insight through a religious
adherence to the two-tiered approach forecloses any meaningful analysis
regarding the interests with which the courts are truly concerned in the
dormant commerce clause cases. 47
42. See infra notes 48-74 and accompanying text. These factors correspond with those
general factors that the Court balances in order to ultimately resolve any particular case.
43. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579 (emphasis added).
44. 486 U.S. 888 (1988).
45. Id. at 891 (emphasis added) (The state had enacted a statute of limitation for breaches
of contract and fraud that would be tolled for parties who were not present in the state.).
46. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (facially discriminatory state regulation is
upheld); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (state regulation that
preserved groundwater and discriminated against out-of-state interests might be upheld under
dormant commerce clause scrutiny).
47. To be sure, the two-tiered approach is not entirely without merit. As I will explain
later, before Garcia, state interests in autonomy and independence were, relatively speaking,
not as important in dormant commerce clause analysis as they have become after Garcia.
Because the courts gave state interests little weight before Garcia, they devoted their attentions
only to the national economic and political unity interests when a state regulation had a
discriminatory purpose or effect. Accordingly, the courts were doctrinally obliged to explicitly
address the state autonomy interests only when the state regulation merely burdened interstate
commerce. In this situation, the regulation would not threaten the national unity interests as
much. Thus, the state sovereignty interests were not automatically overshadowed by the unity
interests and the courts could overtly address these interests in this second-tier balancing
analysis. Nevertheless, a multi-factor analysis was consistently maintained throughout both
tiers of the dormant commerce clause doctrine. The only effective difference between the two
tiers was the degree of importance doctrinally given to the unity interests in this multi-factor
analysis, not the absence of any judicial consideration of the states' sovereignty interests.
1992]
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Courts evaluate several factors in dormant commerce clause analysis.4
Three of these factors disfavor state regulations that impede interstate
commerce in any way: (1) the intent of the Framers, (2) fear of interstate
hostilities-both economically and politically, and (3) apprehension of biased
local political'processes. 49 On the other side of the balance are two factors
that weigh in favor of state regulation of interstate commerce: (1) the
traditional interests and notions of state sovereignty and (2) the limits of
judicial competence. 0
The Framers of the Constitution created the nation's new government in
an environment where economic warfare between the states was considered
a threat to the unity of the nation. Indeed, one of the fundamental reasons
the Framers were initially drawn to the Constitutional Convention in 1787
was to resolve these perceived problems by creating a centralized power to
reign over interstate commerce."' In particular, the Framers were concerned
that some states had ports that other states needed to use to conduct
interstate trade.12 As Justice Jackson stated in H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du
Mond 53
[A] drift toward anarchy and commercial warfare between states began.
"[E]ach State would legislate according to its estimate of its own
interests, the importance of its own products, and the local advantages
48. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1203,
1205 (1986) ("Ultimately ... [the dormant commerce clause situation presents] a question of
degree. Imbued with legal realism, we no longer suppose that legal doctrines can be so precise
as to leave no room for judgment .... We realize that every legal value eventually conflicts
with others and must be balanced against them.").
49. Id. at 1206.
50. Id. Donald Regan also has derived from these cases similar factors which weigh against
state protectionism. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. Rav. 1091, 1113 (1986). The essence of Regan's
analysis, though, is that the only kind of state regulations that should be struck down by the
courts are regulations that have protectionist purposes. Thus, he would look to discriminatory
effect only as evidence of a protectionist purpose; he might not find that effect fatal in itself.
Indeed, he would even look beyond the facially discriminatory language of a state regulation
in search of a protectionist purpose. If none existed, then the statute would be upheld in spite
of its explicit discrimination. As a result, he would entirely discontinue any interest-balancing
analysis in the dormant commerce clause doctrine.
While Regan and Smith may have "similar" understandings of the dormant commerce clause
doctrine, Smith, supra note 48, at 1204 n.8, Smith faults Regan (among others) for too much
analysis of what the Court ought to be doing, rather than first describing, cogently and
comprehensively, what the Court is doing. Id. at 1204.
51. Pomper, supra note 2, at 1313. See also C. WARREN, Tan MAKING OF TH CONSTITUTION
567 (1928). But see Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULATION,
FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMRCE 9, 17-20 (1981) (Perceived threat may have been based
on unreasonable fear.).
52. 3 Tan RECORDS OF Trn FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 547-48 (M. Farrand ed. 1937)
[hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS].
53. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
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or disadvantages of its position in a political or commercial view." This
came "to threaten at once the peace and safety of the Union."' 4
The fundamental concern was that the states were imposing greater economic
burdens on out-of-state interests while granting economic advantages to
those interests within the state.5 5 This imbalance created hostility and com-
mercial warfare among the states. The solution was to centralize power over
interstate commerce in Congress.
Thus, to the degree that the Framers' intentions are relevant in a modern
analysis of commerce clause issues, 56 their concern with the threat that
interstate commerce conflicts posed to the political and economic unity of
the nation was nevertheless legitimate. Unfortunately, the threat seems to
have transcended time.57 Since such threats maintain their legitimacy today,
though perhaps to a lesser degree, they are still valid factors for the courts
to consider."
State regulations that impede interstate commerce threaten economic unity
by posing an obstacle for goods to overcome in their migration to higher-
valued uses. Economic efficiency cannot be achieved when society must
forego the use of a good that is artificially placed at a higher value than
the market would normally require.5 9 This is precisely what occurs when a
state forces out-of-state entities to pay higher prices for access to its markets
and resources. Political unity is also threatened when a state regulates
against out-of-state interests. Regan refers to these phenomena as the
"resentment/retaliation objection" to protectionist state regulation. 60 As he
explains:
Protectionist impositions cause resentment and invite protectionist retal-
iation. If protectionist legislation is permitted at all, it is likely to
generate a cycle of escalating animosity and isolation (and even of
hostility in the strongest sense, where the harm to foreign interests is
valued as such), eventually imperiling the political viability of the union
itself.6'
54. Id. at 533 (quoting I J. STORY, CoMiMNTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 259-60 (R. Rotunda and J. Nowak ed. 1987) (1st ed. 1833)).
55. 3 CoNvENnoN REcoRDs, supra note 52, at 441.
56. For discussions of the value of the Framers' intent in constitutional analysis, see Garcia,
469 U.S. 528 (Powell, J., dissenting); J.C. GnRu , supra note 21, at 85 (Professor Frug
noted that any "reference to framers' intent is a way to disguise one's own political positions
by suggesting the position is actually someone else's."); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for
the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rv. 204 (1980); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,
56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 471-500 (1981); Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 226 (1988).
57. See Regan, supra note 50, at 1114-15.
58. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623; H.P. Hood, 336 U.S. at 538.
59. See R. POSNER, ECONOMc ANALYSIS OF LAw 254-59 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing economic
efficiency in the context of market monopolies).
60. Regan, supra note 50, at 1114.
61. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Finally, the courts are concerned with biases against unprotected out-of-
state interests in the political processes of state or local governments. The
courts' primary concern is that because foreign interests are not represented
in the local legislative processes, their interests will not be fairly considered
as a moderating factor. 62 However, this factor has generally been insignif-
icant in the courts' decisions. 6
While these three factors weigh against discriminatory state regulations,
the courts consistently assert at least two factors that weigh in favor of
allowing state protectionist regulation. As mentioned, these factors are the
limits of judicial competence and traditional interests of state independence
and sovereignty.
The Supreme Court acknowledged its own inability to assess "competing
considerations in cases involving state proprietary action ... under tradi-
tional commerce clause analysis" because such considerations are "subtle,
complex, [and] politically charged." 64 As the Court stated in Reeves, Inc.,
"the adjustment of interests in this context is a task better suited for
Congress than this Court." 6 Michael Smith has also identified situations
where courts are particularly incompetent to assess the competing interests
under the commerce clause: "One . . . require[s] the courts to distinguish
among regulations according to the subjective intentions of those who
enacted them .... [The other] type ... require[s] the courts to assess the
full economic incidence of state regulations. "6 Thus, even if one concedes
that the courts' analysis of the dormant commerce clause is legitimately
grounded within the Constitution's vision,67 "it may [nevertheless] be too
62. This rationale was initially imported into the commerce clause doctrine by Justice Stone
when he asserted it in South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S.
177 (1938). The case was decided in the same year as United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, where the same argument was asserted in the context of individual rights.
63. Smith, supra note 48, at 1209; see also Pomper, supra note 2, at 1315 ("Furthermore,
nonrepresentation of nonresidents is not a procedural flaw; rather it is fundamental to our
federal system in which states retain a measure of independence .... "); cf. Eule, Laying the
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 437-46 (1982) (asserting that the Court's
major concern should be with the biases of local political processes, but that this concern
should be constitutionally grounded in the privileges and immunities clause rather than the
dormant commerce clause); Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIs.
L. REv. 125, 130-41 (arguing that different state discriminatory regulations implicate different
local process concerns).
64. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
65. Id. at 439.
66. Smith, supra note 48, at 1211.
67. But cf. Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-
Owned Resources, 59 Tax. L. Rav. 71 (1980) (asserting that there is no justification for
applying the dormant commerce clause analysis in the context of natural resources); Redish &
Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987
DUKE L.J. 569 (arguing that the Constitution provides no textual legitimacy for the dormant
commerce clause doctrine and that consideration of such issues should be resolved under other,
textually "legitimate," constitutional doctrines).
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difficult or too delicate for judicial enforcement; it may be appropriate for
enforcement only by political or moral means."es
The most important factor favoring a state's regulation, and the one with
which this Note is concerned, is the role of state sovereignty interests under
the dormant commerce clause. Some of the more important interests en-
compassed in the concept of state sovereignty include the states' abilities to
experiment and create a wide variety of solutions to problems occurring
nationwide, 69 to act as a means of local and democratic self-government,
7 0
to serve as a counterbalance to the centralized power of our national
government 7 and to more effectively protect the safety and health of its
citizens.72 For examples of the courts' discussions of these underlying
interests, one need only look to cases that fall into the "second tier" of
the dormant commerce clause analysis-where the Pike v. Bruce Church
balancing analysis occurs.73 However, because the economic and political
unity factors have dominated the balancing process when state regulations
fall into the "first tier" of the analysis, the importance of state interests in
autonomy has been obscured. Nevertheless, the Court has acknowledged
both their existence and importance in this first tier of the analysis.7 4
2. The Market Participant Exception
to the Dormant Commerce Clause
The "market participant" doctrine was first established in 1976, the same
year as the National League of Cities decision. Before 1976, the Supreme
Court only addressed state regulation of private interstate commerce activity.
However, in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,7 5 the Court held that when
a state regulates the conditions of its own participation in the market, rather
than the market itself, even state regulations that are explicitly discriminatory
68. Smith, supra note 48, at 1211.
69. "[A] principle advantage of a federal system [is] the use of the states as small-scale
social laboratories, so that other states-or the federal government itself-might benefit by
the experience, without incurring all of the possible risks that might result from a similar
nationwide experiment." Redish & Nugent, supra note 67, at 598.
70. "[The] two key goals of our constitutional federalism [are] the encouragement of novel
state experiments and the fostering of governmental responsiveness to distinctive local needs."
Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88
MICH. L. Rav. 395, 429-30 (1989).
71. Id.
72. See L. TAmE, AmisucA CoNsurzoNAL LAw 539-40 (1988); Rapaczynski, supra note
21, at 380-90.
73. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888 (1988); CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456 (1981).
74. Maine, 477 U.S. 131; Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617.
75. 426 U.S. 294 (1976).
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against out-of-state interests are permissible. 76 The Court's rationale for this
doctrine was that market participation regulations are not the kind of
regulations "with which the commerce clause is concerned." ' 77 'thus,
"[n]othing in the purposes animating the commerce clause prohibits a State,
in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and
exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." 78
Reeves, Inc.79 was the next Supreme Court case to address the market
participant doctrine. In that case, South Dakota operated its own cement
production plant. The state adopted a policy that it would sell to any buyer
regardless of the buyer's residency so long as its plant could meet all of its
orders. However, if the plant was unable to meet all of its orders, the state
would discriminate against out-of-state buyers and only sell cement to
resident buyers until all of their orders were met. The Court held that
although the policy was clearly discriminatory it was not unconstitutional
under the dormant commerce clause. Instead, because the State had created
this resource through the construction of a "costly physical plant" and the
use of "human labor"-both paid for by state tax revenues-the usual
dormant commerce clause concerns with economically protectionist legisla-
tion would not be implicated. 0
Because the state's resolution did not directly interfere with interstate
competition for the natural resources81 involved in the production of cement,
but instead involved the selling of a commodity that the state had actually
created, the legislation did not present a threat to the nation's economic
and political unity. Significantly, the Reeves, Inc. Court reasoned that
"[riestraint in this area is also counseled by considerations of state sover-
eignty, [and] the role of each State 'as guardian and trustee for its people."'' '
76. Indeed, Coenen refers to market participant regulations as being "virtually per se"
valid. Coenen, supra note 70, at 404. This language was chosen to mimic Justice Stewart's
language in City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624, where he stated that discriminatory market
regulations are "virtually per se" invalid. However, Coenen makes it clear that in both cases
"virtually" does not mean "always."
77. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 805.
78. Id. at 810.
79. Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. 429.
80. Id. at 444. In this light, the Court also stated that the following warning clearly had
no application in this situation: "If a state in this union, were allowed to hoard its commodities
or resources for the use of their [sic] own residents only, a drastic situation might evolve....
The result being that embargo may be retaliated by embargo and commerce would be halted
at state lines." Id. at 429.
81. The Court stated that the natural resource cases-which generally hold that natural
resources are not unique articles of commerce deserving separate treatment under the dormant
commerce clause-did not apply. Id. at 444; see Hughes, 441 U.S. 322; Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). See
generally Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 67.
82. Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 438 (quoting Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903)).
[Vol. 67:511
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Court further stated that these "[c]onsiderations of sovereignty inde-
pendently dictate that marketplace actions involving 'integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions' ... may not be subject even
to congressional regulation pursuant to the commerce power."'8 3 Moreover,
the Court stated immediately thereafter that "[elven where 'integral oper-
ations' are not implicated, States may fairly claim some measure of a
sovereign interest in retaining freedom to decide how, with whom, and for
whose benefit to deal."' 4 The Court also reasoned that the dormant com-
merce clause restrictions would significantly limit a state's ability to create
a respectable relationship with its citizenry and that it would "threaten the
future fashioning of effective and creative programs for solving local prob-
lems and distributing government largesse.""3 Thus, "[a] healthy regard for
federalism and good government" made the Court "reluctant to risk these
results." 86
Two cases following Reeves, Inc.-White v. Massachusetts Council of
Construction Employers87 and South-Central Timber Development v.
Wunnicke88 -further modified the market participant doctrine. In White,
the Court held that the doctrine protected a municipal ordinance even
though the statute "impose[d] restrictions that reach[ed] beyond the im-
mediate parties with which the government transacts business."8 9 Although
two Justices dissented to the particular application of the market participant
doctrine to the facts of White, all accepted the doctrine's validity.90
Wunnicke was the first case in which the Court declined to use the market
participant doctrine to protect a state's discriminatory regulation. 9' The
plurality opinion said that the "limit of the market-participant doctrine
must be that it allows a state to impose burdens on commerce within the
market in which it is a participant, but allows it to go no further."2 The
plurality's position was grounded in the concern that unless the market was
defined narrowly the market participant doctrine would swallow the entire
83. Id. at 438 n.10 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852).
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 441.
86. Id. The dissenters disagreed with the holding because it allowed explicit interference
with the "free national economy" contemplated by the commerce clause. Id. at 454 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
87. 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (The Court upheld a requirement that at least one half of the
work force on city-funded projects be composed of that city's residents.).
88. 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (The Court struck down the state's law requiring that timber taken
from state lands be processed in the state before it may be shipped elsewhere.).
89. White, 460 U.S. at 211 n.7.
90. Id. at 218-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Justices have not been consistent in their
dissents to the application of the market participant doctrine. Coenen, supra note 70, at 405.
Each Justice, though, has acknowledged the validity of the doctrine at one time or another.
91. Four Justices denied the application of the market participant doctrine, three Justices
did not reach the issue, and two Justices dissented.
92. White, 467 U.S. at 97.
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dormant commerce clause analysis.9a Thus, the Court prohibited the state
from regulating state-owned timber beyond the moment it was sold. 94
Only two post-Garcia Supreme Court cases have raised the market par-
ticipant issue.95 The Court declined to consider its application in both of
them. Because federal regulations had preempted the state regulation, the
Court refused to apply the doctrine in Gould.96 In Limbach, the state
regulation was not shielded from dormant commerce clause scrutiny simply
because the nature of the state regulation did not invoke the market
participant doctrine. The state had levied a tax against out-of-state interests
while favoring its own citizenry. "The [state] action ultimately at issue
[was] ... its assessment and computation of taxes-a primeval govern-
mental activity." 97 Since the state regulation involved a fundamental gov-
erment function, the state could not have acted as an ordinary market
participant. Accordingly, the dormant commerce clause's economic and
political unity concerns were squarely implicated. Thus, because the reasons
for the doctrine did not apply, the Court disallowed the exception.
Two main factors in the market participant doctrine's evolution are related
to the Garcia opinion's effect on the dormant commerce clause analysis.
First, the Supreme Court fully embraced the doctrine on the same day that
National League of Cities was decided. The Court has only had two other
opportunities to consider the validity of the doctrine since Garcia was
decided. However, it declined to apply the doctrine or address its continuing
validity in both cases. Therefore, the doctrine's theoretical validity after
Garcia is still unclear. The second factor is that the exception is recognized
by the Court, as well as many bommentators, a as being grounded in
"considerations of state sovereignty, [and] the role of each State as 'guardian
and trustee for its people.' 99
C. Garcia's Effect on Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
While Garcia held that the tenth amendment is but a truism and that the
political process theory explains the role of states' rights in our federal
93. Id.
94. Thus, the state will be protected from dormant commerce clause restrictions when it
discriminatorily stipulates to whom it will sell the good, but the state cannot dictate how those
purchasers are to use or process that resource.
95. Limbach, 486 U.S. at 277 ("The market participant doctrine has no application here.");
Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor, and Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
96. Gould, 475 U.S. at 289.
97. Id.
98. Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 67; Coenen, supra note 70; Regan, supra note 50. As
Coenen stated: "Mhe market-participant exemption to the dormant commerce clause" is an
"important vehicle through which the modem Court has moved to protect local prerogatives."
Coenen, supra note 70, at 397.
99. Smith, supra note 48, at 1210.
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system whenever interstate commerce is regulated, the Court specifically
qualified the scope and impact of the political process theory by stating
that this process is only the "basic" and "primary" means of protecting
state interests.' ® Implicit in the Court's language is its recognition that there
are other means of protecting state interests when interstate commerce is
involved. This conclusion is not only supported by the Court's use of
specific qualifying language, 101 but also by the Court's citation to Coyle v.
Oklahoma, °2 the reservation of its role in policing this "process" to ensure
that the governmental processes will function properly to protect state
interests,103 and its explicit statement that there are other affirmative limi-
tations on Congress's commerce clause powers.1°4 Although the Court did
not specify what other means of protection it was referring to, this Note
asserts that these qualifications were directed toward the dormant commerce
clause and the market participant doctrines. The Court could not have
intended for these secondary means of state protection to be left untouched
by the sweeping federalism principles established in Garcia. Thus, proceeding
on the premise that Garcia is "correct," I will apply the Garcia principles
and structure to the dormant commerce clause analysis of balancing federal
and state interests.
The Garcia Court concluded that the primary means for protecting state
interests was through the political processes envisioned in the constitutional
structure- of -our federal government. The Court reasoned that it was
constitutionally required to defer to Congress any role in protecting state
interests because state interests are structurally represented in Congress and
because Congress is the most capable and democratic institution established
for proper consideration of these interests. The main role Garcia reserved
for the judiciary under the commerce clause and the political process theory
is to police these political processes to ensure their proper functioning.
Thus, as Justice Blackmun stated, "Any substantive restraint on the exercise
of commerce clause powers must find its justification in the procedural
nature of this basic limitation, and must be tailored to compensate for
possible failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a
'sacred province of state autonomy."' 10 5 Accordingly, the judiciary's role is
to ensure that state interests are properly represented in Congress. And
when the political processes cannot ensure such representation, the courts
must then intervene in the process to champion state interests.
100. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985).
101. See also supra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
102. 221 U.S. 559 (1911), cited in Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
103. The Court further reserved the right to analyze a situation and apply its own standards
of judicial review when the political processes are not working properly.
104. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554-57.
105. 469 U.S. at 554 (emphasis added) (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236
(1983)).
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However, Garcia did not specifically address the question of whether the
federalism structure and principles it embodied extend to dormant commerce
clause analysis. To answer that question, one must address two other issues.
The first question is whether the principles that justify the political process
theory in Garcia also support the theory's application to the dormant
commerce clause. Assuming that the principles behind the theory do support
its application, the second question is whether the national political processes
nevertheless fail to protect states' interests in dormant commerce clause
situations-thereby obligating the courts to step in to insure that state
interests are being protected when interstate commerce issues are involved.
1. Applying Garcia's Principles to the Dormant Commerce Clause
The Garcia Court relied primarily on two principles in adopting its
political process theory. The first principle is that any delineation of an
absolute sphere of state sovereignty is unworkable.' °6 The second principle
is that the judiciary is the least appropriate branch for identifying and
balancing interests when deciding which state activities deserve preemptive
status despite national interests in that activity. These two principles apply
to dormant commerce clause situations as well. Thus, the federalism struc-
ture adopted in Garcia should also govern dormant commerce clause anal-
ysis.
Courts addressing dormant commerce clause issues have long recognized
the validity of the principle that any attempt to delineate an absolute sphere
of state sovereignty rights is untenable. Although initially used in a different
context, the substance of the following comment is appropriate here: "[W]hen
interests are described as 'rights,' accommodation is impeded. Defining an
interest as a right masks the nature and complexity of what is actually at
stake ... [and it] makes accommodation seem to be the breaching ... or
the defining away of a right and thus, a ... political wrong." 107 Thus, if
the Supreme Court were to hold that states have absolute sovereignty in
certain areas under the dormant commerce clause, the courts would quickly
become entangled in the difficult situation of either respecting that right by
protecting it in all of its legitimate extensions °8 or whittling it away through
unprincipled redefinitions and suspiciously narrow applications whenever it
106. Id. at 556-57.
107. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CAHu. L. REv. 151, 172
(1988).
108. This would be particularly true in a situation where Congress later decides that federal
regulation is needed. If the Court held that the state was sovereign, this predicament would
fall into the scope of the Garcia and National League of Cities confrontation.
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conflicted with other interests the courts needed to recognize.1°9 Two con-
sequences often result from these kinds of dilemmas. First, a line of
irreconcilable cases usually develops, such as the situation that occurred
under National League of Cities. Second, the Supreme Court, and the
judiciary in general, lose the public's respect as an impartial institution of
justice, at least to the degree that the accommodation is perceived as being
unprincipled.
While the Court arrested these problems in Garcia, the Court did not
hold that the judiciary should entirely stop considering the state sovereignty
interests. Indeed, the Court considers these interests along with competing
interests under the dormant commerce clause balancing analysis. Thus, the
fact that the Court continues to recognize state sovereignty interests in its
analysis under the dormant commerce clause is not inconsistent with Garcia,
and it indicates that this analysis falls under the exception to Garcia's
political process theory.10
The second principle addressed by the Garcia Court is found in its holding
that the very process of judicial delineations of absolute spheres of state
sovereignty is inappropriate because such delineations are undemocratic.
Through such delineations, the courts would disregard the constitutionally
established means of resolving state issues through Congress. Indeed, as the
Court has recognized, this principle is partially applicable to the dormant
commerce clause analysis as well."' However, this recognition does not
indicate that the Court's continued balancing analysis under the dormant
commerce clause is inconsistent with the concerns embodied in this principle.
To understand why this element of the Garcia Court's analysis does not
extend completely to the dormant commerce clause situation, it is necessary
109. As new issues are brought before the courts, they will be faced with tasks that they
cannot effectively undertake without seeming to impinge upon the state's absolute right. For
example, suppose the Court holds that states are sovereign when they do X. When a state is
doing X, federal legislation cannot interfere with it. Assume also that when a state is doing
X, it infringes upon individual rights. These citizens cannot turn to their congressional
representatives to enact protective legislation, even if the other states in the nation disagree
with the state's behavior, because each state is sovereign while it is doing X.
Thus, the only effective way for citizens to seek redress is for courts to hold that their
individual rights are constitutionally protected. However, courts must proceed cautiously here
because without clear textual support from the Constitution they often face the criticism of
recognizing only those individual rights which comport with their own judicial biases and
political agendas. If individuals are to have fundamental constitutional rights, their rights
should not be subject to these kinds of variations. This controversy is most prevalent in the
area of substantive due process rights. D. Locx:m, THE PERVERTED PuomrrEs oF AmuRIcA
PoLITIcs 89-99 (2d ed. 1976).
110. See infra notes 120-27.
111. Several commentators have suggested that the courts should step entirely out of the
dormant commerce clause analysis for this reason alone. Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 67;
Redish & Nugent, supra note 67.
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to first understand why the Court found the judiciary's intervention to be
inappropriate in the affirmative commerce clause context.
The Court offered two rationales to support its conclusion that the judicial
branch should not delineate the respective spheres of sovereignty. First, the
judicial branch itself is an undemocratic institution."2 Although the Court
did not elaborate on this rationale, presumably it was referring to the
concern that because of the very nature of our adversary legal system courts
would make delineation decisions based upon imperfect and nonrepresen-
tational information."3 The core characteristic of this system is that the
courts must generally deliberate only on those arguments and interests that
the advocates bring before them and then only in the light which those
advocates have chosen to cast upon their case. Furthermore, the judiciary
is not capable of independently and adequately investigating the empirical
support or factual validity of the information presented in the arguments
before it. Accordingly, the courts would delineate absolute spheres based
upon information that is likely to be both incomplete and skewed in favor
of the advocate presenting it.
Because the judiciary is not a democratic institution, the "full story"
cannot be told. Courts do not open their doors for true representation and
equal consideration of every interest that has a legitimate stake in the
outcome of their decisions. Because the courts are limited to case-by-case
adversarial resolutions, they would make sweeping and absolute decisions
based upon imperfect information. When the political processes are oper-
ating effectively, the Garcia Court reasoned that this would be particularly
unacceptable because the democratic and investigative features of Congress
established it as the more appropriate institution for rendering such deci-
sions." 4
Thus, the second reason for the Garcia Court's self-disqualification is
that while the courts are the least capable institutions for making delineation
decisions Congress is the best institution for that function. Congress is an
institution where there is the opportunity, at least theoretically," 5 for all
competing interests to be fully represented and investigated. Thus, the Court
reasoned that when it is functioning properly Congress is the most capable
institution available for balancing the state and federal interests involved
whenever interstate commerce is regulated.
These two rationales partially apply to the dormant commerce clause
analysis." 6 While the Court should not necessarily remove itself completely
112. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
113. This is not to say that a democratic institution such as a legislature operates on perfect
information because it is representational. Instead, the relationship is relative. A democratic
institution is better suited for acquiring perfect information than the courts.
114. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547-55.
115. See generally D. LocICARD, supra note 109, at 49-89.
116. While in both commerce clause situations the Court is concerned with the common
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from the dormant commerce clause analysis based on these rationales, the
Court should recognize that its capabilities to competently balance the
interests involved in the dormant commerce clause are extremely limited.
To be sure, the Court has recognized these institutional limitations in the
dormant commerce clause context.117 However, the courts should pursue
these concerns by actually limiting the scope of their balancing role in the
dormant commerce clause analysis.
The Garcia Court ultimately held that a judicial delineation of absolute
state sovereignty rights was improper and undemocratic because the Con-
stitution had already provided for the protection of state interests through
Congress, which structurally represents the entire spectrum of state sover-
eignty interests through its political processes. The principles adopted in
Garcia in support of this political process structure endorse its application
to the dormant commerce clause situation as well. The courts have not
attempted to delineate absolute spheres of state sovereignty in that context,
and this is consistent with Garcia's principle that they should not even
attempt to do so. Moreover, the judiciary is a relatively incompetent
institution for balancing the interests involved in determining the level of
recognition to be given to state interests in the dormant commerce clause
context."' Finally, the Framers intended that the federalism structure em-
bodied in the Constitution account entirely for state interests whenever
interstate commerce is involved-including situations where Congress had
yet to act. 19 Thus, the principles of the political process theory extend from
the affirmative commerce clause context to the Court's role in the dormant
commerce clause situation as well.
2. The Adequacy of Protection for State Interests Under Garcia
Since the political process theory applies to the dormant commerce clause,
the next question is whether those political processes are indeed operating
element of balancing, the results of balancing in each case are significantly different. In the
affirmative commerce clause context, the courts balanced under National League of Cities to
establish absolute spheres of state sovereignty. However, in the dormant commerce clause
context, the courts balance to determine the appropriate outcome for the particular cases
before them as determined by the interests implicated in the facts of those cases.
117. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
118. The fact that the Court continues to balance interests under the dormant commerce
clause, while admitting to be the least capable institution for balancing these interests, seems
to create a contradiction. This apparent anomaly will be resolved in the next section.
119. This is true whether the Court would then hold either that Congress has exclusive
jurisdiction over interstate commerce (even when it has not yet acted) or that the states are
completely unfettered to regulate interstate commerce until Congress acts. The political process
theory could thus accommodate either holding because the states could always change the
effects of either holding by resorting to the national political processes and enacting more
desirable federal legislation.
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to adequately protect the states' sovereignty interests. 120 Under Garcia, when
Congress affirmatively decides either to act or defer to state control, by
virtue of its very composition, it takes into consideration the states' interests.
The same conclusion does not follow, though, in the dormant commerce
clause situation where Congress has not decided anything at all. Thus, the
states' interests are left in a constitutional limbo where they are unaccounted
for and unprotected. Accordingly, the courts' role is to accommodate this
lapse of structural protection by assuming the responsibility of affirmatively
protecting-but not necessarily guaranteeing-these state interests. For the
past fifty years, the courts have divined the national interests in a unified
economy and polity. Thus, this change of roles represents a fundamental
change in the dormant commerce clause analysis.
Whether the courts should even continue to play a role in the dormant
commerce clause analysis after Garcia is a difficult issue to resolve because
two divergent conclusions seem equally plausible under the political process
theory. The first conclusion is that the courts should have no role at all
because the political processes would continue to adequately protect the
states' interests even though Congress has not yet acted. The underlying
rationale here is that if the states are dissatisfied with the status quo they
can always resort to federal legislation to change it. For example, even if
the Court held that there is exclusive federal jurisdiction over all interstate
commerce, the states could still protect their interests by resorting to federal
legislation in any particular area. 21 Similarly, if the Court were to hold the
opposite-that the states may freely regulate interstate commerce until
Congress decides to regulate-and certain state regulations were causing
economic and political disunity, the states, acting vicariously through Con-
gress, could again change the status quo established by the Court. Until
that point there would be no real threat to national unity, or Congress
would have responded to resolve that problem through its political processes
and regulatory powers. The distinguishing characteristic of this alternative
is that the courts would have absolutely no role under the dormant commerce
clause other than to define the initial status quo of jurisdiction over interstate
commerce. 1,
120. See supra text accompanying notes 100-06.
121. This is not too different from the Court's current stance under the dormant commerce
clause. The key difference, though, is that the Court has emphasized only a strong preference
for protecting national unity interests in interstate commerce. The Court has not held that
these federal interests have exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, courts, continue to balance all of the
relevant interests-including the states'.
122. Indeed, several commentators have argued for such a result. Redish & Nugent, supra
note 67; Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 67; Tushnet, supra note 63. The common thread of
criticism levied against the courts is that once an article of commerce is identified as being
involved in interstate commerce, under the dormant commerce clause balancing analysis, the
courts are performing functions which Congress was constitutionally designed to perform
democratically. Thus, these commentators conclude that courts should step out of the analysis
entirely.
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This alternative represents an extreme view of the impropriety of the
judiciary's role in the dormant commerce clause analysis. In addition, it is
out of touch with the reality of the courts' continued role in the doctrine's
interest-balancing analysis. More importantly, though, this alternative is not
necessarily dictated by the application of Garcia to the dormant commerce
clause situation because, while the "judicial incompetence" principle un-
derlying the political process theory applies in part to the dormant commerce
clause, the federal political processes do not adequately protect the states'
interests. Because there are simply too many competing interests which need
to be considered and balanced in applying the dormant commerce clause-
where neither the text of the Constitution nor Congressional action provide
any guidance for the proper resolution of these interests-Garcia's structural
protection does not apply. To protect these interests, the courts must
continue to play some role in the dormant commerce clause analysis.Iu
The opposite approach appears more practical and in line with the courts'
actual practice.'2 It recognizes that because the political processes do not
function effectively when Congress has not acted affirmatively the courts'
continued intervention is necessary to protect the states' interests. The courts'
continued intervention is dictated by the fact that state interests are left
unprotected in this constitutional limbo and by the fact that there are
legitimate national unity interests implicated when states regulate interstate
commerce. The need for a resolution of these interests outweighs the Garcia
Court's reasoning that the judiciary is institutionally incompetent for re-
solving such issues-particularly in light of the fact that Congress is unwilling
to address these important interests. Nevertheless, Garcia's reasoning does
indicate that the courts should significantly restrain their analysis.
123. Also, were the judiciary to cease to fulfill its balancing role, it would represent a
monumental change in the evolution of commerce clause doctrine. As one commentator has
put it: "[I]t is unrealistic to expect the Court to abandon a doctrine that has been an important
and firmly-rooted part of its federalism jurisprudence since Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53
U.S. 299, 317-19 (1851)." Pamper, supra note 2, at 1314 n.29. Even Justice Scalia has accepted
the legitimacy of the doctrine, albeit in a narrowly defined set of circumstances. See New
Energy Co. v. Limbach of Ind., 486 U.S. 269 (1988). Such a monumental change would also
force the Court to fashion a new theory for characterizing the status of states' interstate
commerce regulations. For example, if the courts may not balance interests at all, does this
mean that federal jurisdiction over interstate commerce is to be exclusive or concurrent? This
is a dangerous predicament for the Court to place itself in because the implications of such a
decision would be both far-reaching and unforeseeable.
124. This approach is more practical simply because it is in accord with what the courts
have actually been doing under the dormant commerce clause after Garcia. That is, they
continue to engage in a balancing analysis of the competing interests involved. See Healy v.
Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 888 (1989); Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm. of
Kan., 489 U.S. 493 (1989); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter., 486 U.S. 888 (1988);
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573 (1986).
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Before Garcia, the courts arguably had a choice between which of the
two general interests they would strive to protect under the dormant com-
merce clause-the states' interests or the national interests. After Garcia the
courts no longer retain such a choice. The political process theory and its
underlying principles apply to the dormant commerce clause, and the states'
interests are protected primarily by that process. Therefore, if that process
fails to function effectively, the Court's self-appointed role' 25 is to remedy
that lapse by assuming for itself those protection functions. Since the
dormant commerce clause situation provides such an occasion, the courts
are now obligated to assertively protect states' interests in their balancing
analysis.
It does not follow, though, that the courts are compelled to protect only
states' interests while neglecting national unity interests. 126 Rather, the courts
simply have to give significantly more protection to states' interests than
they have in the past. Due to the very nature of a multifactor balancing
analysis, it is inherently impossible to say just how much more protection
is required. Nonetheless, given this fundamental goal of protecting states'
interests, and given the Court's declarations of its own inadequacies in
performing a balancing analysis of national and states' interests, the courts
should manifest a definite bias toward the protection of states' interests
whenever states are regulating interstate commerce. 27 Thus, after Garcia,
state regulation of interstate commerce should encounter significantly less
stringent standards of judicial review because the courts primary concerns
should now lie with protecting states' interests-at least until Congress
dictates otherwise.
D. Garcia's Effects on the Market Participant Doctrine
Because Garcia explicitly overruled National League of Cities, the contin-
ued vitality of the market participant doctrine has been questioned-at least
to the degree that it is believed to be founded upon tenth amendment
substantive state sovereignty rights. However, two theories shelter the doc-
trine from Garcia's sweeping changes. The first is that the Court recognized
the market participant doctrine as a power reserved for the states under
article IV, section 3, of the Constitution. As such, the doctrine represents
one of the affirmative limits on Congress's commerce clause powers that
the Garcia Court exempted from its political process structure of federalism.
The second theory is that because the market participant doctrine arises
when Congress fails to act the political processes are not functioning at all.
125. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
126. Indeed, this would conflict with Garcia's principle that there can be no absolute spheres
of state sovereignty.
127. If Congress does not.agree with a court's state-favored resolution of the interests at
stake in a particular case, it can readily change the result through the political processes.
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Thus, as in the dormant commerce clause context, the courts are obliged
to protect states' interests in this particularly important area of state
government.
Immediately after Justice Blackmun stated that it was not necessary under
Garcia's facts to identify or define what other "affirmative limits the
constitutional structure might impose on federal action affecting the States
under the commerce clause,"' he cited Coyle v. Oklahoma'29 as an example
of one of these affirmative limits. Coyle holds that when Congress admits
new states into the Union under its article IV, section 3 powers, it is
obligated to grant new states the same sovereignty powers constitutionally
retained by all other states. Thus, in a new state's enabling act, Congress
could require certain conditions to be met which relate to matters wholly
within its own sphere of federal power but not conditions relating to those
constitutionally retained areas of state control.
In Coyle, as a condition to Oklahoma being admitted to the Union,
Congress attempted to require it to move its state capital from Guthrie to
Oklahoma City and to further desist from spending any of the state's public
funds on the construction of a different capital building. 130 The Supreme
Court held that to allow Congress to do this would have "placed [the state]
upon a plane of inequality with its sister States in the Union."'' Such
congressional conditions of admission would not only lead to a nation
composed of unequal states, but also deprive the states of their constitu-
tionally retained powers and rights. Thus, the Court held that the state's
powers to locate its own seat of government and to appropriate money for
that purpose was constitutionally protected. 32
The Court extended this protection of states' rights to post-admission
federal regulation as well. The Court held that "such powers may not be
constitutionally diminished, impaired or shorn away by any conditions ...
embraced in the [enabling] act which would [also] not be valid and effectual
if [it were] the subject of congressional legislation after admission."'3 Thus,
because the states' powers to locate their state capitals and spend their
public funds were constitutionally protected before admission into the
Union, it followed that they were also not constitutionally "valid and
effectual ... subject[s] of congressional legislation after admission' 34 into
the Union.
Through Coyle, the Garcia Court acknowledged that the states' power to
spend public funds is a constitutionally retained affirmative limit against
128. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
129. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
130. Id. at 564.
131. Id. at 565.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 573.
134. Id.
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Congress's commerce clause powers. This power was retained through the
principles embodied in article IV, section 3, of the Constitution. Accord-
ingly, these powers may not be "diminished, impaired, or shorn away"
either by Congress acting under its affirmative commerce clause powers or
by the courts acting through the dormant commerce clause analysis. The
Garcia Court recognized the independent constitutional validity of the
market participant exception 3 5 and indicated that, as such, the exception
would not be disturbed by its holding. Moreover, this constitutionally
retained state power is precisely what the Court referred to in Reeves, Inc.
when it stated that "[e]ven where 'integral operations' are not implicated,
States may fairly claim some measure of a sovereign interest in retaining
freedom to decide how, with whom, and for whose benefit to deal."' 3 6 This
statement firmly establishes the Court's continued recognition that the
market participant doctrine rests on an entirely separate conception of state
sovereignty rights than those models rejected in Garcia. The doctrine is
founded on a constitutional right retained by the states and not granted to
Congress. It represents an affirmative limit on Congress's commerce clause
powers. Accordingly, the doctrine survives Garcia.
Even if the market participant doctrine does not serve as an affirmative,
independent constitutional limitation on Congress's commerce clause powers,
the courts nevertheless use it appropriately when they apply it in dormant
commerce clause cases to protect a state's regulation. This follows because
the political processes are not operating effectively in the dormant commerce
clause situation. After Garcia the courts' main purpose in such situations
is to affirmatively protect states' sovereignty interests while at the same time
recognizing their own institutional incompetency in this area. Accordingly,
even if the doctrine is not a substantive constitutional right in itself, it is
at least the embodiment of several extremely powerful state interests which
the courts have consistently recognized under dormant commerce clause
analysis.
This theory of the market participant doctrine is consistent with Coenen's
assertion that the rule "has proven less rigid than some initially feared.' ') 37
Because the doctrine is one of the most powerful embodiments of the states'
interests, it has usually outweighed, as opposed to absolutely preempted,
the national unity interests. As Coenen and other commentators have pointed
135. Indeed, in this light, the use of the label "exception" is a bit of a misnomer.
136. 447 U.S. at 437, 438 n.10 (emphasis added) (citing The Supreme Court, 1975 Term,
90 HARv. L. REv. 56, 63 (1976)). "Integral operations" was the standard adopted in National
League of Cities for delineating a sphere of absolute state sovereignty rights. 426 U.S. at 852.
This standard and principle were rejected by Garcia as "unworkable." 469 U.S. at 546.
137. Coenen, supra note 70, at 397. Coenen's approach "rejects an all-or-nothing approach
to these cases, advocating instead a sensitive application of the market-participation rule in
light of its underlying justifications." Id. at 398.
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out, the doctrine has its roots in several different state interests. 138 The most
important of these interests include the states' abilities to provide services
as the localized 'guardian[s] and trustee[s] for [their] people""' 39 and to
serve as social models and laboratories which are seeking, on a vast diversity
of fronts, the optimal solutions to common national problems.' 4° When a
state is "participating in the market," these interests command a great deal
of weight in the courts' balancing analysis.
Moreover, the competing national interests in avoiding economic and
political hostility are weak when the state is acting as a market participant.
Political unity is not threatened because the scope of the state's activity is,
by definition, limited to only those contacts it makes as an ordinary market
participant. While these contacts may not necessarily be small in number,
they nevertheless do not invoke resentment among other states because the
participant state's discriminating activity is generally accepted in a capitalistic
society where freedom of contract tends to reign. Thus, it seems equitable
to all to allow a state to spend its own resources as it sees fit. Economic
138. Coenen provides a summary of the state sovereignty principles and values embodied in
the doctrine:
First ... it is fair and consistent with broadly shared conceptions of property.
Second, the values of federalism suggest a need to avoid interference with state
autonomy in this area.... Third, market-place preferences ... pose less of a
danger to commerce clause values. Fourth, formal considerations-emanating
from constitutional text and history-suggest that states should have a free hand
when dealing in the market .... And fifth, institutional considerations counsel
heightened caution in applying the dormant commerce clause to market-participant
cases.
Id at 420. The "institutional considerations" to which the author refers encompasses the
relative incompetency of the courts as an institution for analyzing the competing interests
involved in the commerce clause. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text; Gell, The
Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause and Landfill Restrictions: An
Analysis After Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 10-14 (1990) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal); Regan, supra note 50, at 1193-1203; Pomper,
supra note 2, at 1320-22.
139. Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 438 (quoting Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903)).
140. Redish & Nugent, supra note 67, at 598. There are two further components to this
interest. First, if our nation has a diversified set of environments in which to develop solutions
to problems held in common across the nation, eventually the optimal, efficiency-maximizing
solution will emerge. Second, if a state cannot retain for its citizens the benefits of its own
experimentation (through recognition of some sort of constitutionally enforced property right),
the state will not spend as much of its resources on such projects. Because of this classic
"free rider problem," states will not experiment and develop solutions to the nation's problems
without some sort of incentive, or personalized return, on its investments. Property rights
provide such an incentive and defeat the "free rider problem" because they allow the state to
exclude others from reaping the benefits of their investment. See J. DuKEmmiNER & J. KRiER,
PROPERTY 38-43 (2d ed. 1988); Postur, supra note 59, at 30-40; Demsetz, Toward a Theory
of Property Rights, 57 Am. EcoN. Ray. 347 (1967). If the investment is indeed efficient and
productive, other states will emulate it-to the benefit of the nation. If not, other states will
still have an incentive to create solutions that are more productive. In this way, the nation's
commonly held problems are effectively resolved by the states.
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unity is not threatened when the state acts as a market participant because
political unity is not assaulted. If the states do not resent one another's
individual business dealings, they also will not take retaliatory measures,
such as purely all-encompassing out-of-state trade restrictions. Economic
unity also is not threatened because the state's policies are limited to only
those parties operating in the same market as the state and those who are
actually doing business with that state.' 4'
Finally, the principles underlying Garcia do not necessarily apply to the
market participant doctrine because courts are much more capable of
delineating the boundaries of the doctrine through such inquiries as whether
the state is participating in the market or regulating the market. Accordingly,
such a delineation is not "unworkable." Moreover, the doctrine is not
necessarily an absolute sphere of substantive rights. Because different factors
come into play according to the different factual contexts of any case, the
courts will shun the process of attempting to define an absolute sphere of
state control and will instead adopt a more flexible factor-balancing ap-
proach. This is especially true if the doctrine is perceived as being a
generalized pattern or result of the courts' balancing analysis under the
dormant commerce clause. Additionally, the courts' presence will not be
undemocratic because it will either be protecting an affirmative constitutional
right or intervening because of the lapse in structural protection created
when the democratic political processes are not functioning to properly
account for states' interests.
Under either conceptualization of the market participant doctrine, Garcia
does not eradicate it. Because the doctrine is either an affirmative consti-
tutional limit on Congress's commerce clause powers or a necessary inter-
vention by the courts, its continued vitality is not inconsistent with Garcia.
II. STATE SOVEREIGNTY INTERESTS AND LANDFILL REGULATIONS
Because state regulation of solid waste disposal falls under the dormant
commerce clause, this Note has addressed how Garcia fundamentally changed
that doctrine so that the courts' primary role now is to assertively protect
state sovereignty interests. However, this is not to say that states have the
freedom to regulate entirely as they please. Rather, the dormant commerce
clause doctrine is still an analysis -where competing interests are to be
weighed and balanced. Accordingly, the constitutionality of any particular
state regulation that burdens interstate commerce cannot be absolutely
guaranteed. Nevertheless, because the courts' fundamental role has shifted
141. Wells & Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law,
66 VA. L. Rzv. 1073, 1127-35 (1980); Gell, supra note 138, at 11 (noting that this argument
loses its strength as the size of the market increases).
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to assertively protecting states' interests-as opposed to primarily protecting
national unity interests-and because of the courts' lack of institutional
competency in balancing these interests, the resolutions of dormant com-
merce clause cases should significantly favor state regulations. Accordingly,
the states should have a great deal more freedom in regulating against the
presently unrestrained consumption of their landfill capacities by out-of-
state entities.
This Note will now briefly address three general types of "burdensome"
landfill regulations which should typically be upheld under dormant com-
merce clause scrutiny: (1) socialization regulations, (2) resource recovery
programs, and (3) facially discriminatory regulations. The ensuing analysis
is intended to serve only as a skeletal outline of how the courts should
approach these regulations under the theories and principles set forth in
this Note. However, before these regulations can be discussed, a preliminary
issue must first be addressed. This issue concerns the question of what
exactly is the article of interstate commerce which is being burdened by
state regulations in this area.
A. Articles of Commerce: Landfill Space,
Landfill Services, and Garbage
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,142 the Court held that a New
Jersey regulation prohibiting the importation of solid or liquid waste created
outside of the state was unconstitutional economic protectionism. The Court
reasoned that even though the state had a legitimate noneconomic-
protectionist goal in preserving the state's remaining landfill resources and
protecting the environment for its citizens, 143 the legislative means discrim-
inated against out-of-state interests in an unacceptable manner. 44 The Court
focused its analysis on the concept that garbage is an article of commerce
despite its generally valueless characteristics. 45
Focusing solely on the rationale that garbage is an article of trade-and
thus, an article of interstate commerce-confuses the true issues that underlie
the problems associated with our nation's landfill crisis. Not only does the
142. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
143. "We assume New Jersey has every right to protect its residents'. . . environment." Id.
at 626.
144. The Court agreed with the plaintiffs who argued that the state's covert interests were
in "suppress[ing] competition and stabiliz[ing] the cost of solid waste disposal for New Jersey
residents." Id. The Court thus avoided the issue of deciding which purpose was the true goal
of the regulation by focusing instead on the legislative means employed: "Mhis dispute about
ultimate legislative purpose need not be resolved.... [T]he evil of protectionism can reside
in legislative means as well." Id.
145. "All objects of interstate trade merit commerce clause protection.... Hence, we reject
the ... suggestion that the state's banning of 'valueless' out-of-state wastes ... implicates no
constitutional protection." Id. at 622.
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label contravene most notions of common sense, but it also contributes to
a deeper sense of injustice being effected by the courts. This sense of
injustice arises from the perception that the courts are basing their restrictive
holdings on an entirely irrational premise. Thus, the constitutional doctrines
courts rely on to prohibit the states from regulating against the importation
of out-of-state garbage seem equally irrational because they too are based
upon this unsound premise. Furthermore, after focusing their analysis solely
on this premise, the courts often ground their decisions on the rationale
that a state is shifting an unacceptable burden to out-of-state interests by
denying access to its landfill resources.' 46 This rationale completely ignores
the reasonable response that these same out-of-state entities equally shift a
burden on the recipient state's citizens by making that recipient state the
dumping grounds for the out-of-state citizens' garbage. Thus, the burden-
shifting argument is also inconclusive and confusing if one focuses solely
on garbage as an "article of commerce."
The courts should explicitly recognize that different conceptions of the
"article of commerce" will more accurately reflect the true nature of the
interests involved in our nation's landfill crisis. Accordingly, the Court
should also analyze burdensome state regulations from the perspective that
they restrict the interstate markets for landfill capacity and landfill services.
The Supreme Court has indicated that these are proper focuses of analysis. 47
However, the courts have not structured their analysis along those lines.
The courts should thus recognize'that all three definitions of the "article
of commerce" are potentially involved when a state prohibits importing
out-of-state garbage.'l By adopting these more focused definitions, the
courts can significantly improve the clarity of analysis and public acceptance
of their discussions of the various interests which are at stake when a state
regulates against out-of-state entities in this area.
B. A Post-Garcia Analysis of States' Landfill Regulations
After Garcia, the courts' new role in the landfill regulation context is to
assertively protect a state's interest in regulating against the consumption
146. Id. at 628.
147. "It is true that in our previous cases the scarce natural resource was itself the article
of commerce, whereas here the scarce resource and the article of commerce are distinct." Id.
148. Additionally, the courts have sometimes mistakenly labelled landfill space as a "natural"
resource. The only natural resource involved in landfilling is the actual underlying, raw land.
When that land is then converted to serve a function for society, such as being a landfill, it
is no longer in its natural state and ought not to be analyzed as such.
Thus, as the courts have acknowledged, there is no compelling need to address constitutional
natural resource cases as distinctively important here. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131
(1986); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322 (1979); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). But see Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 67 (arguing for a per
se application of the market participant doctrine to all of a state's natural resource regulation).
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of its landfill space by out-of-state interests. Also, Garcia significantly
bridled the extent of the courts' balancing analysis because they cannot
effectively balance the competing interests involved in this area. As a result
of these changes, it should be significantly easier for states to regulate the
interstate solid waste disposal market as it pertains to the depletion of their
existing landfill capacity.
1. Socialization Regulations and the Market Participant Doctrine
Since 1978, the state regulations that have been the most successful at
avoiding the City of Philadelphia's definition of garbage as an article of
commerce are those which establish the state's activity as falling under the
market participant doctrine. 49 Since Garcia did not eliminate the doctrine,
these regulatory attempts have largely been, and should continue to be,
successful. As one author has noted, over eighty-one percent of the nation's
landfills are owned and operated by the state or local government.15 0 Thus,
the implications of this application of the market participant doctrine are
quite significant.
A state can take advantage of the market participant doctrine in two
important ways. The first is to socialize the state's landfill industry. In
LeFrancois v. Rhode Island, ' 51 for example, Rhode Island monopolized the
landfill industry operating within its borders. It then prohibited any disposal
of out-of-state waste in state-owned landfills. The district court upheld the
regulation as a valid exercise of the state's powers under the market
participant doctrine. The only major twist in the court's analysis was to
distinguish between the market for landfill sites and the market for landfill
services. 52 The significance of this distinction is that if the state's actions
were characterized as "hoarding a resource"-landfill sites-it could still
face liability for federal antitrust violations, even if the state was protected
from dormant commerce clause scrutiny. By focusing on landfill services
and emphasizing that the state had not prohibited out-of-state interests from
purchasing and operating their own landfill sites within the state, the state
was able to avoid both commerce clause scrutiny and antitrust allegations.
149. See generally Swin Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989),
aff'g 678 F. Supp. 116 (1988); Industrial Maintenance Serv. Inc. v. Moore, 677 F. Supp. 436
(S.D.W. Va. 1987); LeFrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987); Evergreen
Waste Sys. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127 (D. Or. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1492
(1987); Shayne Bros. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984); County
Comm'rs v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 473 A.2d 12 (1984).
150. Pomper, supra note 2, at 1311 ("mhe practical impact of these [cases] is to let the
exception swallow the Philadelphia v. New Jersey rule.").
151. LeFrancois, 669 F. Supp. 1204.
152. Coenen, supra note 70, at 461 n.383. See, e.g., LeFrancois, 669 F. Supp. at 1211
(arguing that the relevant market is in neither refuse nor land, but rather in the services
rendered in disposing of garbage).
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States could also benefit from the market participant doctrine by sub-
stantially subsidizing, instead of monopolizing, privately owned landfill
facilities. The state would thereby make itself a silent partner to an entity
that is participating in the landfill market. By investing its tax revenue
dollars in that partnership with the expectation of an investment return, the
state, too, would be participating in the market. As a result, it could set
the partnership's policies regarding the entities with which it will do business.
This approach under the market participant doctrine has yet to be tested.
Nevertheless, if the proposal withstands judicial scrutiny, the market par-
ticipant doctrine will allow the state to enact out-of-state discriminatory
policies and preserve remaining landfill capacities for its own citizenry.
However, like the first approach, this scheme would face public resistance-
resistance to governmental intervention in this market and resistance to the
vast expenditures of state revenues necessary to implement these schemes.
2. Resource Recovery Regulations
Another type of state regulation which would-rely primarily upon the
market participant doctrine for its protection is state-enacted recycling and
resource recovery programs. For example, such programs might require all
landfills to accept only solid waste that has first been separated as "true
waste" through an effective recycling process. This requirement would
facially apply evenhandedly to both in-state residents and out-of-state en-
tities. Although the law would burden interstate commerce under the dor-
mant commerce clause, the Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality
of such regulations. In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.'53 the Court
held that a state regulation which prohibited the sale of milk in plastic
bottles was a valid regulation. Because the regulation applied evenhandedly,
and because the state had legitimate state interests in protecting the envi-
ronment, conserving resources, and easing solid waste disposal problems,
the fact that it burdened interstate commerce did not render the regulation
constitutionally impermissible. Also, in City of Philadelphia, the Court
stated that "it may be assumed . . . that New Jersey may pursue [similar
legitimate] ends by slowing the flow of all waste into the State's remaining
landfills, even though interstate commerce may incidentally be affected."' 54
The establishment of recycling and conservation programs is only the first
step in my analysis under this regulatory scheme. 55 The second step is to
153. 449 U.S. 456 (1980).
154. 437 U.S. at 626 (emphasis in original).
155. It is also helpful to recognize, as was implicit in Reeves, Inc., that "states are people-
people who have banded together." Coenen, supra note 70, at 422. As people, they are
endowed with the right to engage in activities that allow them to accumulate property. In this
regard, state governments are merely representational institutions that embody the interests
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recognize that by enacting a statewide recycling and conservation regulation,
the state is actually creating a resource-extra landfill capacity. For example,
suppose the citizens of a state consume ten units of landfill space each year
prior to the enactment of a recycling program. After a recycling program
is operating, the state consumes only four units of landfill space per year.
By engaging in these recycling and conservation efforts, the state-acting
through its entire citizenry-has actually created six extra units of landfill
capacity. This extra landfill space is the "end product of a complex process
whereby ... human labor" was expended in acquiring it.1s6 Under Reeves,
Inc. this state would be entitled to dispose of that state-created resource
however it desires because of the market participant doctrine's protection
from dormant commerce clause scrutiny. Accordingly, the state could enact
discriminatory regulations to ensure that its own solid waste disposal needs
were met first.
The Court explicitly recognized the validity of this theory in Sporhase v.
Nebraska.15 7 In Sporhase the state enacted a regulation to preserve its
diminishing supplies of scarce groundwater. The regulation also prohibited
the exportation of its groundwater to other states unless the recipient state
had a "reciprocal agreement" allowing Nebraska to import water from the
recipient state. Nebraska's regulatory scheme was challenged on the ground
that other conservation provisions contained therein, which applied "even-
handedly" to all interests, were "undue burdens" on interstate commerce.
The Court rejected the rationale of this challenge to these conservation
provisions: "ITihe continuing availability of ground water in Nebraska is
not simply happenstance; the natural resource has some indicia of a good
publicly produced and owned in which a State may favor its own citizens
in times of shortage." ' Thus, the Court did not merely reject the "undue
burden" argument, but it also recognized the validity and propriety of the
market participant principles here. 59 Although the Court did not directly
address the market participant theory and indeed invalidated the statute on
and rights of its citizenry. When the state government requires its constituency to engage in
or abstain from a certain activity, it is essentially imposing those requirements upon itself.
Accordingly, when the state enacts recycling and resource recovery regulations, it is imposing
those resource recovery requirements upon itself.
156. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 444 (1980). The "costly" element of the human
labor does not have to be measured in mere dollars and cents. The citizens have incurred
other economic costs by forgoing the hassle-free solid waste disposal methods utilized before
the recycling regulations were enacted.
157. 458 U.S. 941.
158. Id. at 957 (citing Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. 429).
159. The initiation of this theory into constitutional doctrine would have the positive effect
of encouraging states to enact conservation and recycling programs since they would be able,
through property rights, to retain the benefits of public goods which they have created. This
result would be a significant development in our nation's struggle to reverse the detrimental
effects of its past treatment of the environment.
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other grounds, this rationale would apply to the "publicly produced" good
of landfill space-a good created when a state undertakes conservation and
recycling efforts in order to preserve its landfill capacities.16
3. Facially Discriminatory Regulations
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Maine v. Taylor.'6' This case is
significant because it is the first time the Court upheld a purely discrimi-
natory state regulation 62 under the dormant commerce clause and because
it is a dormant commerce clause case decided after Garcia. The Court found
the regulation to be constitutionally permissible because the discrimination
was "justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism."' 63
Thus, the Court held that discriminatory regulations are constitutional if
they "serve] a legitimate local purpose, and the purpose is one that cannot
be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means."''  This is a
significantly different standard than that applied by the Court in City of
Philadelphia where the Court held that it would apply "a virtually per se
rule of invalidity" whenever discriminatory legislative means were in-
volved. 65
When a state enacts a discriminatory regulation prohibiting out-of-state
consumption of its landfill capacity, the Court has consistently recognized
that the state has "legitimate local interests" in protecting the state's
environment and preserving the state's resources.'6 With Maine, the Court
has demonstrated its willingness to aggressively protect these state interests
in accordance with its modified role after Garcia. Under the Maine holding,
the Court will only invalidate a state regulation if the challenger can establish
160. Even if the courts were to find the market participant doctrine inapplicable under this
theory, the substantial state interests involved would, under the modified dormant commerce
clause analysis, outweigh the national unity interests because "obviously, a state that imposes
severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating against interstate
commerce when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of [its resources] out of the
state." Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 955-56. Since political and economic unity would not be
implicated, the substantial state interests would undoubtedly be protected by the courts in the
modified dormant commerce clause balancing analysis.
161. 477 U.S. 131.
162. The state regulation explicitly prohibited the importation of all species of live baitfish
from out-of-state interests. Id. at 133.
163. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988) (restating Maine in an
overview of the Court's dormant commerce clause analysis as it was changed by that case).
164. 477 U.S. at 138.
165. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
166. Id. at 626 ("[W]e assume New Jersey has every right to protect its residents' ...
environment."); Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 471 ([T]he states have legitimate local
interests "[w]hen legislating in areas of legitimate local concern, such as environmental
protection and resource conservation."). The weight of the state's interest is substantially
increased when there is a crisis because of scarcities in the availability of the resources involved.
See, e.g., Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941; Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. 429.
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that there are no other reasonable purposes for the regulation other than
"economic protectionism."'' 67
In Maine, the regulation's legislative history demonstrated that there were
clearly economic protectionist motives behind the regulation?168 However,
the Court entirely discounted this fact by reasoning that despite this purpose,
"there is little reason ... to believe that the legitimate justifications the
State has put forward for its statute are merely sham[s] or 'post hoc
rationalizations."'1 69 Under this analysis, once the state asserts plausible
legitimate interests, the challenger has the burden of proving them to be
"shams or post hoc rationalizations." Significantly, though, Maine's as-
serted interests in protecting the environment and preserving its resource of
domestic baitfish were particularly weak in this case.17 0 As the Court
admitted, the state's interests could "ultimately prove to be negligible"
because the state's arguments-that the importation of live baitfish from
foreign waters threatened their own domestic resources and environment-
were based entirely on "imperfectly understood environmental risks."'1'
Nevertheless, the Court held that the state was not required "to sit idly by
and wait until potentially irreversible environmental damage" had occurred
from the importation of these foreign articles of commerce despite the lack
of any evidence whatsoever'72 that they truly threatened the domestic
167. Indeed, if the plaintiff can establish such a solitary motive, then the national unity
interests would outweigh the state's sovereignty interests. Hence, the Court would be justified
in striking down such a regulation under the modified dormant commerce clause. See also
Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (citing Limbach, 486 U.S. 269; Maine, 477
U.S. 131; Sporhase, 438 U.S. 322) ("[T]his Court ... [will] strik[e] down state statutes that
clearly discriminate against interstate commerce ... unless that discrimination is demonstrably
justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protection." (emphasis added)). The Healy
Court struck down a state statute primarily on the grounds that it regulated interstate commerce
activities "wholly outside its border." Id. at 337. The Court further grounded its decision in
the rationale that because the state had advanced no neutral justifications for the discriminatory
legislation and because there was only the economic protectionist purpose the statute could
not withstand dormant commerce clause scrutiny.
168. See Maine, 477 U.S. at 149.
[W]e can't help asking why we should spend our money in Arkansas when it is
far better spent at home? It is very clear that much more can be done here in
Maine to provide our sportsmen with safe, homegrown bait. There is also the
possibility that such an industry could develop a lucrative export market [for us
in our] neighboring states.
Id. (quoting Baitfish Importation: The Position of the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries
and Wildlife, App. 294, 309-10).
169. Id. (quoting Hughes, 441 U.S. at 338 n.20).
170. Shields, Maine v. Taylor Natural Resource Statutes Against the Commerce Clause or
When Is a Hughes Not a Hughes But a Pike?, 29 NAT. REs. J. 291, 299-300 (1989) ("Maine
did not uphold its burden of proof. Maine did not prove that the importation . . . would
damage its [resources], it only conjectured possibilities .... Allowing conjecture to undermine
commerce clause scrutiny may create special dispensation for environmental regulations.").
171. Maine, 477 U.S. at 149 (emphasis added).
172. Id. For example, the state first alleged that the imported baitfish carried a parasite
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environment. Thus, it will be extremely difficult for an out-of-state entity
to ever meet its burden of proving that the regulating state's interest are
merely "shams or post hoc rationalizations."
By upholding Maine's purely discriminatory regulation on the ground that
it was based on legitimate (yet entirely unsubstantiated) claims, the Court
significantly changed the degree of scrutiny it will exercise in this "tier" of
dormant commerce clause analysis. This change is in accord with this Note's
thesis that Garcia's federalism principles and political process structure
significantly modified the courts' role in the dormant commerce clause to
that of assertively protecting states' interests. 73 After Maine and Garcia, a
state need only assert interests that are plausible and unrelated to economic
protectionism in order for its regulation to be upheld. While these assertions
must be plausibly 74 related to the regulation, the state need not substantiate
them. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that .the regulation was
enacted for the sole purpose of economic protectionism. This is a difficult
burden because the plaintiff must disprove the state's other plausible interests
which are embodied in the regulation and, in the case of environmental
regulations, which the Court has already recognized as legitimate.
The Maine analysis applies to discriminatory landfill regulations. After
Maine and Garcia, the courts should uphold a state regulation whicht
prohibits out-of-state solid waste because the recipient state has legitimate
local interests in prohibiting that out-of-state garbage and landfill consump-
tion. The Court has consistently acknowledged the legitimate local interests
of environmental protection and resource conservation which strongly sup-
port these regulations. Furthermore, the courts' primary role after Garcia
is to protect these interests. Thus, a plaintiff challenging a state regulation
which prohibits out-of-state garbage will not be able to overcome these state
interests and convincingly establish that the nation's unity interests are truly
foreign to its own waters. The parasite would apparently harm certain species of domestic
baitfish. However, Maine could not prove that this harm would occur because there was
absolutely no evidence to support this contention. The state also was unable to prove that the
parasites were not already in their own waters because out-of-state baitfish could easily swim
into Maine's waters. Finally, there was only one particular type of baitfish species which was
even alleged to carry the parasites. However, the regulatiQn prohibited the importation of all
baitfish. Again, the Court overlooked this and accepted the state's argument that this "threat"
was significant enough to justify an absolute embargo against all species of baitfish.
173. In addition to the Maine and Healy decisions, the Court has only considered one other
facially discriminatory state regulation in the dormant commerce clause context after Garcia.
See Limbach, 486 U.S. 269. The Limbach regulation was struck down. However, the Court
was justified in doing so not only because the regulation simply levied a tax against out-of-
state entities, but also because the regulation's clear purpose was pure economic protectionism.
Thus, the national unity interests clearly outweighed the state's interests involved in that case.
174. I choose not to use the phrase "rationally related" only because that term implies a
constitutional standard where the Court will not scrutinize the regulation's asserted interests
at all. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964). I do not
believe that to be true in these cases.
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threatened because economic protectionism is the sole purpose of the reg-
ulation. Accordingly, the regulations should be upheld by the courts. 75
CONCLUSION
Garcia fundamentally changed the judiciary's role in the dormant com-
mere clause analysis. Although Garcia specifically addressed an affirmative
commerce clause situation, the principles and political process theory struc-
ture adopted there have sweeping implications for all federalism issues
involving interstate commerce. As part of its holding, the Garcia Court
reserved an important role for courts when the political processes are not
operating effectively. In these situations, the courts are to assertively protect
states' interests. Because the dormant commerce clause situation represents
such an occasion, the courts now have an obligation to intervene to protect
states' interests in the dormant commerce clause factor-balancing analysis.
The implications of this theory are far-reaching. As applied to state regu-
lations that prohibit the importation of out-of-state waste, courts should
recognize their modified roles under this theory and uphold such regulations
as constitutionally legitimate attempts to protect the rapidly diminishing
i,-source of sanitary landfill space.
175. Cf. Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Ind.
1990) (striking down the discriminatory state landfill regulation as a violation of the commerce
clause).
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